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Abstract: We present a novel method to trace the propagation of intrusions or malicious 
code in networked systems. Our solution is aimed at large numbers of loosely 
managed workstations typical of a research environment as found in CERN. 
The system tags events which have a potential to become harmful. On a given 
machine all processes that results from the tagged event are marked with the 
same tag and the tag is carried on to others machines if a tagged process 
establishes a connection. Tag creation logs are stored in a central database. 
When an intrusion is detected at a later time, all machines and processes that 
may have lost their integrity due to this incident can easily be found.  This 
leads to a quick and effective restoration of the system. Our implementation of 
the system is designed to incur very little overhead on the machines and 
integrates easily with many flavors of the Linux operating system on any type 
of hardware. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Undesired intrusions are always a problem but intrusions in large groups 
of workstations are particularly serious. This is especially true if the 
workstations are managed by their users or many groups rather than by a 
single central entity. An intrusion showing up at a given workstation may be 
the result of the compromise of various intermediate machines. All implied 
machines may not show the same symptoms with some compromised 
machines not showing any symptoms at all. Cleaning up all machines that 
show symptoms is thus not enough. Malicious code may still be lingering 
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deep in a machine and strike again when all other machines have been 
restored. Restoring all systems is not an option when there are too many 
machines or too many managers.  
2. THE LARGE SCALE ATTACK RECORDER 
(LASCAR) 
The large scale attack recorder provides a mean to find out exactly which 
machines have been hit by a given attack. LASCAR is divided into three 
parts, the recorder, the database and the analysis tool. The recorder consists 
in a module loaded on every hosts of the workstation cluster. This module 
tracks all the events in each workstation and logs the needed information to 
the central integrity database. Two types of events are logged by the 
recorder: process events and network events. The analysis tool parses all the 
events in the integrity database and reconstructs all propagation paths within 
and between the workstations. Once a potential integrity breach has been 
detected, the analysis tool is able to trace back the origin and the evolution of 
the breach in the cluster protected by LASCAR. In particular, it can 
determine which are the corrupted machines in the cluster and visualize the 
path and the propagation of the attack.  
 
Figure 1. LASCAR at work 
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2.1 Existing Work 
Our approach of recording the propagation of suspicious activities across 
processes and workstation is quite unique. Previous work that is related to 
our approach includes:  
• The EMERALD system [2] is an advanced intrusion detection 
system aimed at large scale networks. It is composed of classical 
IDS systems distributed on all elements of the network and of an 
intelligent method to merge and correlate all information 
gathered. It is a heavy system in the sense that complex statistics 
have to be gathered in many places of the network and it suffers 
from typical shortcoming of IDS, namely that they generate false 
alarms and that they are not able to detect new classes of attacks 
that were not imagined by their conceivers. Our contribution is 
much more lightweight and humble, in the sense that we do not 
actually detect attacks but we gather evidence for later damage 
assessment and integrity restoration when some other system or 
person has detected an attack. 
• For database security it has been proposed (e.g. in [1]) to tag data 
in order to indicate whether it is correct, damaged to some extend 
or even unsafe to use. The tags propagate when datasets are 
combined in calculations. The advantage of the method is similar 
to our case: In case of loss of integrity only the damaged data 
needs to be reconstructed rather than the whole database. 
• In [3] the propagation of intrusions across multiple workstations 
is formally stuidied. The results of the paper could allow us to 
find out the intrinsic properties of an intrusion by matching our 
data to the mathematical models. 
2.2 Tagging inside a workstation 
 Inside every machines of the LASCAR cluster, the recorder monitors 
network and processes activities. Using the Linux Kernel modules (LKM) 
ability to intercept system calls, it can log every incoming or outgoing 
connection on the machine and every new listening socket or session id 
(SID) change. 
When the machine receives an incoming connection, LASCAR checks 
whether this connection is considered as trusted or not. In the latter case, the 
recorder logs the event and tag the process handling this connection with a 
“suspicious” flag. This flag indicates that the corresponding process is 
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launched by an untrusted connection and thus can be potentially dangerous 
for the machine integrity. All child processes on the machine will 
automatically inherit this flag. In order to limit the volume of information 
logged, the recorder does not log every new process that inherits a 
“suspicious” flag but only processes that are created within a new session. A 
new session is typically created when a user launches a process in the 
background or when multiple interactive sessions are run in different 
windows. Lastly, the recorder logs all outgoing connections which are 
established by flagged processes.  
A suspicious activity (and  a potential loss of integrity) can thus be traced 
on the machine from the point where it entered the system up to all points 
where connections were made to other machines. 
 
2.3 Tagging on the network 
The previous method can be generalized to the entire LASCAR cluster. 
However in this case, the "suspicious” flag must now be remotely 
transmitted amongst machines of the LASCAR cluster. 
The simplest way of propagating the flag is to set a bit in the IP header of 
the packets transmitted by a flagged process. This could for example be one 
of the Type Of Service (TOS) bits which are not usually used within a local 
network. (An alternative would be the “evil bit” suggested in [4] published 
on april fools day this year). The best way of using such a bit would be to 
use the default value of the bit for the flagged processes and to use a non-
default value for all other processes. Thus, packets providing from machines 
not running the LASCAR recorder would automatically appear as 
suspicious. Since connections from outside the cluster are considered 
suspicious anyway and administrator privileges are required to set IP header 
bits, only machines within the cluster where the administrator account has 
been compromised could avoid logging by resetting the bit. A more secure 
approach would be to use a set of bits to carry the result of a cryptographic 
calculation. For example, the calculation of the IP packet ID field (16 bits) 
could include a secret key owned by the LASCAR recorder. Finally, to 
prevent manipulation of the flag in transit or creation of spoofed packets, the 
IPsec protocol could be used to authenticate all packets in a 
cryptographically secure way. 
In summary, an incoming connection will be logged by the recorder only 
if it comes from a machine outside the LASCAR cluster or if its IP header 
indicate that the connection was generated by a process previously marked 
as “suspicious”. All connections internal to the cluster and originating from 
clean processes won't be logged by LASCAR. 
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3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
To illustrate the behavior of LASCAR we have chosen two scenarios that 
have been recorded by our implementation of LASCAR: a normal user 
activity and a computer worm. 
3.1 Normal user activity 
Figure 2 shows an output of LASCAR analyzer generated from the 
integrity database. It shows the connection of a user to the LASCAR cluster 
composed by lasecpc12, lasecpc15 and lasecpc16. The user launches an 
xterm window and from that window he connects to two other machines, 
maybe to launch two calculations. In the original session he starts the lynx 
browser to access a web site on the Internet (198.133.219.25)  
Lasecpc12 receives the incoming ssh connection from an outside host at 
the IP address 128.178.73.68. It logs the connection attempt and its two 
subsequent sessions: xterm and lynx. We see that each session then 
connects to others machines.  
 
Figure 2. Propagation graph of a normal user behavior generated automatically by LASCAR 
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Lasecpc15 and lasecpc16 consider the incoming ssh connections as 
untrusted, even though they come from a machine inside the cluster. Indeed, 
connections were launched by sessions that were carrying the “suspicious” 
flag. 
3.2 Computer worm behavior 
The second example illustrates the evolution of a computer worm inside 
a cluster where machines are exposed to a common vulnerability of the 
secure shell program (SSH) on port 22. In this case, the worm enters through 
an external connection and corrupts a first machine of the cluster. It then 
tries to initiate each time two outgoing connections to replicate itself To 
simulate a work behavior we have manually connected a host by ssh and 
recursively opened two new sessions to random hosts from every ssh 
session.  
With the help of LASCAR, we are able to trace back the evolution of the 
worm replication inside the cluster. In particular, we see that machines 
lasecpc15 and lasecpc16 are infected twice. When the attack has been 
detected, the LASCAR analyzer provides an exhaustive description of the 
attack path and scope with the id of the machines involved. This allows 
cluster administrators to quarantine only the corrupted machines of the 
cluster. In particular, the analysis of the propagation path may identify 
machines that have been infected but are not showing any symptoms of 
infection.  
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Figure 3. Propagation graph of a simulated computer worm plotted by LASCAR 
4. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS  
LASCAR has been implemented on Linux using Linux Kernel Modules 
(LKM). These modules allow administrators to load and unload features on 
the fly inside the operating system kernel. LKM was the ideal solution for 
LASCAR since it combines the power and speed of being directly integrated 
into the kernel together with the flexibility of an independent program. 
Similar solutions are available on others UNIX systems.  
The first implementation of the recorder was made specifically for the 
CERN network as a connection logger. After further research it has evolved 
to the actual LASCAR. Two functionalities were needed in order to 
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implement the recorder: interception and modification of the connections 
and tagging of processes. 
When a network event occurs or a new session is created, the 
corresponding system call is intercepted and LASCAR output is generated 
accordingly. The output can be customized, but it contains at least minimal 
security information such as connection IP addresses, ports numbers and 
processes info (session id, process id, user id) for the LASCAR analyzer. In 
the case of a process, we set a "suspicious” flag on the process called by the 
incoming connection. Every child process then automatically inherits this 
flag. 
All the logs generated by the recorder are forwarded by the logging 
daemon to a remote integrity database, which centralize the logs of the 
LASCAR cluster needed by the analyzer to generate graphs of the LASCAR 
reports as shown in section 3. The analyzer currently uses timestamps to link 
the events between different machines (e.g. an outgoing connection and the 
matching incoming connection on another machine), since the concept of 
flagging trough TOS bits has not yet been implemented. Additionally, it has 
the ability, as a forensic tool, to regenerate graphs of a whole attack based on 
several criteria or to perform some basic intrusion detection using a blacklist.  
5. DISCUSSION: LASCAR AND INTRUSION 
DETECTION 
LASCAR is not an intrusion detection tool by itself. Its main function is 
to record traces of potential intrusions. Still, it can provide basic intrusion 
detection capabilities. 
5.1 The suspicion criteria or identifying the potential   
troublemakers: 
LASCAR only tags potentially harmful connections and processes. To do 
so it must have some criteria to identify potential harmfulness. In our case 
the criteria simply is the fact that a connection origins in a machine outside 
the cluster. This reflects the belief that the malicious activity that we want to 
trace enters the cluster from the internet, either because an attacker is 
targeting the cluster or because the attack propagates automatically and 
arbitrarily hits the cluster. If desired, the tagging criteria could be extended 
to include any process that acquires root privileges. More complex criteria 
could be made available by running a complete intrusion detection system on 
each workstation and using its output. The important point about our 
approach is that there is no need for such a complicated way of finding 
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potentially harmful connections or processes. Indeed, we could even try to 
tag and log all connections and processes. The use of the suspicion criteria 
only serves to relieve the load on workstations and the main database.  
5.2 The detection criteria or finding out when you have 
been hit: 
Tagging and logging is only one part of LASCAR. The other part is the 
analysis of the gathered information in order to identify the machines that 
have lost integrity. To start an analysis we first need to know that we have 
been attacked. The most evident way of detecting an attack is when its first 
symptoms become visible (e.g. data loss, deterioration of service). Of course 
it would be more useful to detect an attack when it first appears. This is the 
goal of all intrusion detection systems. Alas, there is no way yet to build an 
IDS which will catch intrusions early and will not create a large number of 
false alarms. In a large setting like ours the amount of false alarms could be 
prohibitive. This is why we resort to logging suspicious activity such that 
when an attack is later confirmed we can go back and quickly get rid of its 
effects. Still, we have built a very pragmatic IDS capability into LASCAR. 
A criteria for attack detection used at CERN is a blacklist of IP addresses of 
servers hosting malicious code. Although not every attack will generate a 
connection to these addresses, any process that connects to the addresses of 
the black list must be malicious. Since connections made by potentially 
harmful processes are logged by LASCAR anyway, attempts to connect to 
addresses from the black list can be signaled with no overhead. 
5.3 Using LASCAR as an IDS tool by itself: 
The graphs that can be created from data gathered by LASCAR describe 
the propagation behavior of potentially harmful code or actions. This data 
contains metrics which are closely related to malicious activity and which 
could lead to an IDS system that would not have the high false alarm rates of 
other known systems. Interesting metrics would be the maximum depth in a 
propagation tree (how many times a suspicious activity has jumped to a next 
workstation), the maximum out degree of nodes in the trees (e.g. how many 
different workstations an activity has jumped to from a single workstation) 
or simply the number of nodes in a graph (how many machines at all have 
been hosts to the same activity).  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
Using a combination of process and connection tagging we have been 
able to create a system that can record the propagation of an activity through 
a cluster of machine and trace back all machines and processes that 
contributed to a loss of integrity. This information makes it possible to 
completely retrace the propagation of an attack and to eradicate 
compromised malicious code and compromised systems without having to 
restore large numbers of unconcerned hosts. Our system is particularly well 
suited for large networks of loosely managed systems as found in academic 
or research environments.  
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